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FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OWNERSHIP, BUSINESS GROUPS 





We examine how ownership structure affects the performance of firms using firm level 
data from a large emerging market, India. We specifically focus on a previously 
unexplored phenomenon, namely the differential role played by foreign institutional and 
foreign corporate shareholders. An examination of more than one thousand Indian listed 
firms suggests that the positive effect on firm performance of foreign ownership is 
attributable to foreign corporations that have, on average, a larger shareholding and a 
higher degree commitment and long-term involvement. Furthermore, we document the 
positive influence of domestic corporations, which are by far the largest blockholders 
with significant monitoring potential. We find an interesting dichotomy in their 
monitoring influence depending on whether they have a group affiliation. We also 
perform an analysis of group firms, the results of which generally suggest a negative 









Understanding the behavior of corporate organization requires a deeper knowledge of its 
governance and the factors that determine the distribution of power among corporate managers, 
shareholders, and directors (Jensen and Warner, 1988). Corporations especially in the Anglo-
Saxon economies are characterized by a pronounced separation of ownership and control. 
Separation of management from ownership allows corporate managers to pursue their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders. Opportunities for managers to do so are constrained by 
different external control mechanisms like the debt market, the takeover market, the managerial 
labor market and the product market. Managers who disregard shareholder interests may be 
ousted after a hostile takeover or simply by powerful shareholders. This presupposes that 
shareholders have an interest to indulge in monitoring managerial behavior. However, 
shareholders differ with respect to (a) incentives to spend resources on monitoring and (b) 
abilities to perform the monitoring task effectively. Shareholders owning a miniscule proportion 
of shares of a firm have very little incentive to devote the necessary time and effort on 
monitoring managers on account of free riding from other shareholders. 
 
Following the seminal work by Berle and Means (1932), a long hiatus ensued and it was 
only in the 1970s that contributions pertaining to the relationship between ownership and 
performance both at the theoretical and empirical level began to pour in. The theoretical 
postulates by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) have been empirically 
tested by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000) and Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998, 2002), to name a few. These studies find 




results are obtained using data from countries with highly developed capital markets, such as the 
United States, Western Europe and Japan. 
 
In emerging and transition economies capital markets are less developed. Governance of 
listed corporations takes place mainly through other means. Family-run business groups play an 
important role in many emerging economies. Government-owned banks and other financial 
intermediaries are often important shareholders and may have incentives and objectives quite 
different from the incentives and objectives of private investors. Consequently, the effect of 
ownership on performance in emerging economies is likely to be different. A common 
characteristic of emerging markets is the presence of foreign shareholders and blockholders. A 
recent survey of corporate ownership across the world by La Porta et al. (1999) finds that 
contrary to the widely held belief; diffused ownership is the exception rather than the norm. The 
same study also highlights the preponderance of blockholdings in general and familial holdings 
in particular among non Anglo-Saxon economies. Recent years have witnessed the birth of a 
growing body of literature examining corporate governance issues utilizing data from emerging 
economies including India: Chibber and Majumdar (1999), Qi et al. (2000), Claessens et al. 
(2000), Khanna and Palepu (2000a, 2000b, 2000c), Khanna and Rivkin (2001), 
Wiwattanakantang (2001), and Chang and Hong (2002). 
 
In this study, we utilize large-scale firm level data of Indian listed corporations to take a 
closer look at the monitoring roles of foreign and domestic blockholders. The paper makes 
several important contributions to the literature. Firstly, the paper extends prior studies, which 
examine the performance impact of foreign ownership. But, with regard to foreign investors, 




of foreign investors namely, foreign financial institutions and foreign industrial corporations. 
There is, therefore, no comparative analysis of the influence of these two types of foreign 
investors on domestic firm performance. Since, the nature of these two different classes of 
investors and their motivations can be fundamentally different, the aggregation of them into one 
common class of shareholders masks certain important results which can only be determined if 
they are analyzed separately. In particular, the result of our study casts some doubts on the 
efficacy of viewing foreign institutional shareholdings as important monitors of companies listed 
in emerging markets.  
 
  Secondly, while foreign ownership is undoubtedly an important component in the 
shareholding of firms in many emerging countries, it is far from being the largest block of 
shareholding in these countries. In this study, we focus on domestic corporate shareholdings, 
which in fact constitute the largest proportion of blockholdings in Indian corporations. We 
document the significant role performed by these large blockholders and also highlight an 
interesting dichotomy in their ability to enhance corporate performance.  
 
Thirdly, this paper provides additional evidence on the relationship between business 
group affiliation and firm performance. Prior research has yielded mixed evidence on this 
relationship. Khanna and Rivkin (2001) and Chang and Hong (2000) provide evidence on 
significantly higher performance of group firms in some countries. On the other hand, Lins and 
Servaes (2002) and Campbell and Keys (2002) find a significantly lower performance among 
group firms for different countries. For India, Khanna and Palepu (2000b) report superior firm 
performance for highly diversified groups, but lower performance for the least and intermediate 





Finally, the study utilizes data from the financial year 1999-2000, a time period 
incorporating many new developments in the Indian corporate scenario. Earlier studies predate 
several institutional changes, which have occurred subsequent to the mid 1990s.  Moreover, 
earlier studies primarily rely on the same database (namely the database maintained by the Center 
for Monitoring the Indian Economy). Our study uses a new database (Capitaline 2000), which 
gives us a detailed break up of all shareholdings, domestic as well as foreign, and thereby yields 
a fresh perspective on the subject. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. The next section 
discusses the institutional environment in India. We develop the hypotheses in Section 3 and 
discuss the data and the variables in Sections 4 and 5. The methodology and the results of the 
study are described in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in 
Section 8. 
 
 2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
In India, until the onset of the liberalization process, which began in 1991, the monitoring 
of corporations was severely constrained on account of a host of factors. Firstly, the market for 
corporate control was virtually non-existent. Mergers and acquisitions were looked upon by the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission with disfavor, and there were 
restrictions on the acquisitions and transfer of shares. Financial institutions remained dormant 
and were instructed by their principal shareholder, the government, not to destabilize existing 




members. Professional managers appointed at the highest echelons of the corporate hierarchy 
were the exception rather than the norm. This blunted the effectiveness of the managerial labor 
market in being an effective monitoring tool. Thirdly, prior to 1991, the domestic market in India 
was shielded from competition by a maze of arcane restrictions laid down by the Industrial 
Development and Regulation Act of 1956 and very high import tariff barriers. This effectively 
forestalled any serious competition in the product market. The cumulative effect of this was that 
family managers remained well entrenched with hardly any accountability on their performance. 
 
The post 1991 time-period marked a dramatic shift in the institutional framework in India. 
Foreign capital (both direct as well as institutional/portfolio investment) leapfrogged from 
minuscule levels to form a substantial component of the country’s total capital inflows.
1 In broad 
terms, foreign direct investments are permitted at a higher level of shareholding. Sector-specific 
guidelines for consideration of such investments by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board are 
stipulated in Annexure 3 and 4 of the New Industrial Policy. These guidelines have been 
amended from time to time to gradually craft an increasingly open investment ambience. Without 
going into the specifics of the guidelines it would suffice to mention that automatic approval is 
granted for a holding of 51 percent and above in most sectors.  
 
On the other hand, the regulatory regime as far as foreign institutional investment is 
concerned can be described as more restrictive. In 2000, the shareholding of an individual foreign 
institutional investor is restricted to a maximum limit of 10 percent of the total issued capital in 
                                                 
1 For the financial year 1990-91 total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows constituted almost 100 million US 
dollars while foreign institutional investment (FII) inflows were negligible. In contrast, by 1999-00 total FDI inflows 
had reached 2162 million US dollars while FII inflows were 3029 million US dollars. When expressed as a 
percentage of India’s total capital inflows the percentage of FDI and FII cumulatively has risen from 1.4 percent to 






an individual firm with a cumulative foreign institutional investment limit of 24 percent. This 
limit can be raised in exceptional circumstances if the board of the domestic company agrees, and 
it is approved by the central bank, the Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 Apart from developments pertaining to the flow of foreign capital, the adoption of an 
nascent ‘takeover code’ in 1994 paved the way for a rudimentary market for corporate control. 
The SEBI (substantial acquisition of shares and takeovers regulations) of 1997 which resulted in 
the formation of extensive guidelines for takeovers, has given further impetus to the growth of 
mergers and acquisitions in India. 
 
In the ensuing period, the process of financial liberalization and restructuring resulted in 
the state sponsored financial institutions losing their privileged access to funds from the 
government and being forced to tap domestic and international markets. This in turn fostered a 
greater sense of accountability with regard to their monitoring roles in Indian corporations. 
Within the firms themselves, Indian companies realized the necessity to foster professionalism in 
their management to remain competitive both in product and financial markets, domestically as 
well as internationally. This led to a new breed of professional managers at the helm of corporate 
affairs and the beginnings of a vibrant market for managerial labor. The dismantling of the 
infamous ‘license raj’
2 and the progressive reduction in import tariffs ignited the much needed 
competition in the product market and exposed firms formerly used to a cocooned existence.  
                                                 
2 The word ‘raj’ is literally associated with the colonial rule of the British. In the text the analogy is made in a similar 
vein with regard to the reign by the politicians, bureaucrats and influential businessmen in India after independence 
in 1947. As per the provisions of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act (1956), permission from the central 
government was needed for investment in new divisions and also for substantial expansion of capacity in existing 
divisions. Industrial licensing reduced competition by acting as a barrier for new entry ostensibly to avoid emergence 
of ‘wasteful’ surplus capacity. It encouraged the establishment of smaller sub-optimal scale plants, partly in order to 
encourage a broader spread of entrepreneurship. The system was often used to push new investments into backward 





These path-breaking measures coupled with the opening up of India’s capital markets to 
foreign direct and portfolio investments, and the gradual adoption of corporate governance codes 
have brought corporate governance issues to the forefront. Furthermore, the amendment in 
December 2000 of the Companies Act of 1956 led to a further improvement in governance 
practices and corporate disclosure norms as evidenced in the revamped listing guidelines of the 
stock exchanges. The listing agreements entail quarterly filing of shareholding data, segmented 
reporting of business activities and the setting of audit committees on the board among others.  
These developments coupled with fact that India is one of the largest emerging economies, 
having a long standing stock market and a large pool of listed companies make it an ideal staging 
ground for our analysis. 
 
It is also necessary to briefly dwell on a specific institutional aspect affecting the analysis 
of Indian firms. It relates to the prevalence of business groups and the complexities of the typical 
board structure of a firm in India. Although there is no legal definition of a group, firms are 
usually classified as belonging to a group when there is common ownership and management by 
family members.
3 Furthermore, as information pertaining to group affiliation is publicly available 
it is relatively easy to identify group affiliation with a degree of accuracy in the Indian context. 
Each firm within a group has a separate legal entity and can be listed separately on the stock 
                                                                                                                                                              
and financial institutions by creating a presumption in favor of supporting projects, which had received approval 
from the government. The inefficiencies generated by the system in turn became the excuse to seek tailor made 
protection through protective trade policies (see Ahluwalia, 1999). 
 




exchange. Groups in India, reflect a mix of the associative groups found in East Asia and 
hierarchical groups prevalent in continental Europe and share a number of features with them.
4 
 
  While firms in India are largely focused entities, the business groups tend to be 
diversified enterprises and have certain features similar to a typical western conglomerate or a 
Japanese  Keiretsu. Similarities exist in the sense that akin to the headquarters of the 
conglomerate, the controlling family sets the overall strategic direction and regulates financial 
transfers. An important difference, though, is that unlike divisions of a typical conglomerate firm, 
each firm in India has its own unique set of shareholding comprising of various blockholders and 
the general public, and unlike the typical Japanese Keiretsu, Indian groups do not have an in-
house financial institution.  
 
Director affiliations in India can be explained along three dimensions: (1) executive and 
non-executive, (2) family and non-family, and (3) group and non-group. For a non-group firm, 
total insider holdings include ownership stakes held by all executive/family directors, all non-
executive/non-family (independent) directors as well as stakes held by relatives of all directors. 
The stakes held by executive/family directors and relatives constitute the owner manager 
holdings and they form the bulk of the director and relative shareholdings. For a group firm, total 
insider holdings include stakes of the above-mentioned categories and the stakes held by 
domestic corporations affiliated with the same group. These aspects are vital to an understanding 
                                                 
4 The associative group, which is particularly common in Japan, is characterized by the absence of a holding 
company and may be viewed as a confederation of firms connected through mutual, non-majority shareholdings. 
Coordination of the group’s business activities is enhanced by commonality of interest of member firms and it is 
exploited through information exchanges and tacit rules of conduct. Hierarchical groups on the other hand are 
defined as a set of companies controlled but not entirely owned by a single main investor. Hierarchical groups are 
often organized as pyramids of companies controlled by the main investor through a holding company. A unique 
feature of pyramidal holdings is that it allows the main investor to exert control with a limited amount of capital. (see 




of the differences between director ownership and insider ownership among group and non-group 




Significant differences can exist in the performance of foreign and domestic firms. Using 
a sample of Canadian firms Boardman et al. (1997) find significant performance differences 
among multinational enterprises or their subsidiaries and domestic firms.
5 Among emerging 
economies, Willmore (1986) analyzed a matched sample of foreign and domestic firms in Brazil 
and finds foreign firms to have higher ratios of value-added to output, higher labor productivity 
and greater capital intensity among others. Among Thai firms, Wiwattanakantang (2001) finds 
that foreign controlled firms exhibit superior firm performance.  In the Indian context, Chibber 
and Majumdar (1999), Khanna and Palepu (2000a) and Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) find a strong 
positive influence of foreign ownership on firm performance. Companies with larger foreign 
shareholdings presumably have superior access to technical and financial resources. They are 
also endowed with superior managerial capital. Ceteris paribus, these competencies should 
translate into superior performance vis á vis firms with lower or negligible foreign holdings. This 
leads us to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Foreign ownership positively affects firm performance. 
 
                                                 
5 See the same study for an overview of literature concerning the performance of multinational enterprises or their 
subsidiaries in comparison to domestic firms in developed economies.  See Jenkins (1990) for a comparative 




During the 1990s, there has been an increasing trend towards transnational equity 
investments in the form of portfolio inflows. There is therefore a pressing need to disentangle the 
effects of foreign ownership in a firm belonging to foreign industrial corporations and those 
belonging to foreign financial institutions. Foreign corporations holding an ownership stake in a 
domestic company tend to invest in firms related to their core business. For example, General 
Motors is much more likely to invest in an automobile company than in a brewery. Thus, foreign 
corporations will have relevant experience and know how enabling it to ‘benchmark’ the 
performance of an Indian company. The nature of such a relationship typically goes beyond 
financial contributions and extends to provision of managerial expertise and technical 
collaborations. In fact, Isobe et al. (2000) find that the extent of a foreign firm’s control over a 
joint venture is positively associated with the degree of resource commitment to technology 
transfer, and that technology transfer in turn is positively related to its local market performance. 
Governments also stimulate investments made by foreign corporations by providing various 
incentives because they provide long-run benefits to the firm as well as the economy. Moreover, 
since foreign corporations tend to be long-term investors, and in most cases, are a single 
blockholder, they have both the capability and strong incentives to monitor the domestic 
company they have invested in. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: Foreign corporate ownership positively affects firm performance. 
 
Foreign financial institutional investors, on the other hand, can behave in a manner that is 
significantly different from foreign corporate investors (see Wilkins (1999) for an extensive 




portfolio investment and foreign corporate investors characterized as foreign direct investment).
6 
In the case of foreign financial institutions, decisions to buy and sell shares of domestic firms are 
made by fund managers, whose performance is measured by comparing their results with a stock 
market index and/or with competing institutions of a similar class. These institutions have 
different investment horizons and are primarily oriented towards stock market based measures of 
performance. They have the requisite incentives to sell their stakes unless a firm can maintain 
short-term capital market gains. Foreign fund managers also manage a portfolio of a large 
number of investments in different industries to obtain the benefits associated with a diversified 
portfolio of investments. Furthermore, the ownership stake of a single foreign institutional 
investor as well as foreign institutional investors as a class in a single Indian firm is legally 
constrained. Consequently, they hold extremely fragmented stakes. 
  
Since foreign institutional investors have different investment philosophies and 
investment horizons, and they come from different countries, it is debatable if they have the 
ability to act as a cohesive block to be an effective player in enhancing corporate performance in 
the companies in which they hold investments. Moreover, they tend to select investments in 
companies, which are large, familiar and actively traded (Kang and Stulz (1997)), and which are 
covered by mass media (Falkenstein (1996)). If foreign institutional investors are dissatisfied 
with a company’s share performance they have the relatively easy option to sell their ownership 
                                                 
6 “The impact of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) on host economies is 
markedly different. Capital is not homogenous. Its use is what matters….A transnational corporation (TNC) transfers 
core competencies and expects return on the whole package, not only on capital provided and mobilized…The 
‘visible hand’ of the firm allocates the resources to productive use. By contrast, the foreign portfolio investor expects 
generally to leave the management of the business (or government) to the recipient….Incentive structures in the use 
of FDI and FPI funds are entirely different. The responses to inadequate performance of the investment can be 
expected to be different with FDI and FPI. The impact of FDI on stock markets tends to be indirect. When FPI 
involves host country securities (stocks or bonds), it becomes associated with the functioning of national stock 





stake. As a result, the foreign fund manager is much more likely to sell the shares of an under 
performing company than to invest time and energy to institute a process of corporate 
restructuring. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1b: Foreign financial institutional ownership is positively associated with stock market-
based measures of firm performance only. 
 
Domestic financial institutions form a significant chunk of the total shareholding of 
Indian firms, and consist of development financial institutions, insurance companies, banks and 
mutual funds. The common thread among all of these disparate domestic financial institutions is 
that they are predominantly government owned and consequently face the commonly associated 
problems of having the Government as the principal shareholder. Government ownership is 
plagued by a number of problems, which reduces their monitoring potential significantly. Firstly, 
the Government’s nominees on the board are typically bureaucrats who are essentially generalists 
with minimal expertise in either the specifics of the firm’s line of activity or corporate matters, 
Secondly, even if these agents of the Government are equipped for the task of oversight in 
corporate matters they do not have a strong incentive to be effective monitors as their tenure and 
career growth prospects are rarely affected by the performance of the companies in which they 
serve on the board as nominees. Thirdly, since governments especially in developing economies, 
espouse significant social welfare objectives, they are less profit driven and hence less vigilant in 
their monitoring role (Ramaswamy et al. (2002)). It can therefore be reasonably assumed that 
these domestic financial institutions bring to bear a detrimental effect on firm performance, 





H2: Domestic financial institutional ownership negatively affects firm performance. 
 
In many emerging countries, domestic corporations are among the largest group of 
blockholders (Claessens et al., 2000). In Indian listed firms they also constitute the largest 
category of shareholders. These blockholders usually have a longer investment horizon. Their 
monitoring incentives as well as their abilities are substantially greater than those of domestic 
financial institutions. Furthermore, in response to the greater competitive and liberalized 
environment in India since the mid 1990s, a number of companies have begun the process of 
acquiring strategic stakes in other companies in an effort to enhance and sustain the domain of 
their core competence. The presence of large corporate shareholders also increases the likelihood 
that a firm is taken over. These domestic corporations are therefore likely to have both the 
incentives and the skills to act as good monitors, which form the basis for the third hypothesis: 
 
H3: Domestic corporate ownership positively affects firm performance.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that owner managers with significant shareholdings 
lead to ‘reduced on the job consumption’ and a greater convergence of interests between the 
principal and the agent. In view of the preponderance of family based firms in emerging markets 
in general, and India in particular, this postulate assumes more significance. Owner managers 
have a strong incentive to manage their companies well and generate wealth as their fortunes are 
tied to the well being of the company. They are after all the promoters of the company and they 
have the greatest stakes (both in tangible as well as intangible terms) associated with the success 





   H4: Ownership by owner managers positively affects firm performance. 
 
Business group affiliation is associated with benefits and costs. Among the beneficial 
effects, Chang and Hong (2000) find that groups companies serve as an organizational structure 
for appropriating quasi rents, which accrue from access to scarce and imperfectly marketed 
inputs such as capital and information. They also offer an alternative to portfolio diversification 
when the markets for risk and uncertainty are absent. Furthermore, they facilitate vertical 
integration thereby eliminating problems arising from bilateral monopoly or oligopoly. Khanna 
and Rivkin (2001) report that groups can boost the profitability of member firms as they fill the 
voids left by the missing institutions that normally underpin the efficient functioning of product, 
capital and labor markets. 
 
On the other hand, Indian groups tend to be diversified entities. Studies such as Berger 
and Ofek (1995) and Lins and Servaes (1999) show that corporate diversification destroys value. 
Furthermore, firms belonging to a group tend to support each other. Thus, a firm performing well 
in the market for products may have to support one or more group companies doing less well. 
Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998) and Rajan et al. (2000) find support for the argument that 
over-investment and cross subsidization contribute to value loss in conglomerates.  
 
While Indian business groups cannot strictly be viewed as conglomerates in view of the 
fact that the individual firms, while akin to divisions in a typical conglomerate, have their own 




multidivisional organizations. These similarities are comparable to the scenario in which the head 
office lays down overall strategic targets and apportions financial transfers across divisions. 
 
  Groups are also characterized by the larger possibility of exploitation of minority 
shareholders through tunneling of resources by the controlling family in the group (Johnson et 
al., 2000 and Bertrand et al., 2002). The extraction of quasi-rents, bridging of institutional voids, 
greater information asymmetry in group operations, the larger possibility of exploitation of 
minority shareholders, and the similarities that exist between conglomerates and group firms lead 
us to believe that there could be a significant differential in the performance of firms belonging to 
a group vis á vis non-group firms.  
 
The empirical evidence on the performance effects of group affiliation is also mixed. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000c) and Chang and Hong (2000) find group affiliation to be positively 
associated with performance. Khanna and Rivkin (2001) in a cross-country study of fourteen 
emerging markets find that in some economies group affiliation is positively associated with 
performance while for others the effect is either negative or insignificant. Lins and Servaes 
(2002) on the other hand in another cross-country study of seven emerging economies 
consistently find that firms associated with industrial groups in these emerging economies are 
characterized by under valuation. Campbell and Keys (2002) find that top five South Korean 
chaebols exhibit significantly lower performance. Khanna and Palepu (2000b) also find a 
significant negative influence on firm performance as measured by return on assets for as many 





The benefits and costs associated with group affiliation are moderated to a considerable 
degree by country specific development policies and group strategies as they evolve over time. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000c) find that the benefits of group affiliation atrophy over time. Guillén 
(2000) finds that the prevailing business climate is conducive to either business groups or 
unaffiliated firms depending on the development strategies pursued by the governments in these 
economies, specifically, those policies that have an impact on the level of foreign trade and 
investment  inflows/outflows. Chang and Hong (2002) find that the business group effects among 
South Korean chaebols mitigate over time. The liberalization measures initiated in India and the 
consequent changes in the economic landscape alluded to earlier in the paper lead us to believe 
that some of the benefits associated with group membership have eroded over time. This coupled 
with the significant negative attributes of group affiliation elaborated on earlier lead us to 
anticipate that on balance the negative effects of group affiliation outweigh the benefits in the 
Indian context. 
 
Consistent with this belief we expect group firms to negatively influence firm 
performance. Consequently, our fifth hypothesis is that: 
 
H5: Group affiliation negatively affects firm performance 
 
In many of the traditional Indian business groups, domestic corporate holding is used as a 
mechanism to exercise indirect control through pyramids and extensive crossholdings. The power 
of corporate shareholders to expropriate wealth of other minority shareholders increases in case 
of group affiliation. Bebchuk et al. (2000) describe the means by which pyramids and cross 




control of a firm while holding less than a majority of the cash flow rights associated with its 
equity. These shareholders might look into their own interests and treat themselves preferentially 
at the expense of others. Such a scenario would result in domestic corporate holding affiliated to 
a group mitigating the monitoring efforts of other shareholders and would abet group insiders in 
their efforts to exercise private benefits of control. Therefore: 
 
H5a: Domestic corporate ownership in group firms will result in lower firm performance. 
 
Consistent with the earlier argument for a negative influence of firms affiliated to groups, 
owner managers belonging to group companies can also exert a negative influence. Their stock 
holdings can mitigate monitoring efforts by other shareholders because in group firms domestic 
corporations and group directors could act in consort to expropriate wealth. Owner managers in 
group-firms may also pursue non-profit maximizing objectives that increase their private 
benefits. Therefore, our final hypothesis is: 
 
H5b: Ownership by owner managers in group firms will result in lower firm 
performance. 
 
4. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The data for the study are collected from a publicly available database named ‘Capitaline 
2000’ maintained by Capital Market Publishers India Pvt. Ltd. The database contains financial, 
shareholding, annual reports and other information filed with regulatory agencies of a large 




we identify the year for which the database reports the maximum number of firms with financial 
and shareholding information. Second, we restrict our analysis to firms listed on the Bombay 
Stock Exchange (BSE), which is the oldest, and one of the two main stock exchanges operating 
in India (the other one is the National Stock Exchange). This is because the reliability of data 
pertaining to performance and share ownership is better with regard to listed firms. Almost all 
published studies related to India use the BSE listing as a basis to construct their samples. It 
enables us to compare the results of this study with those of previous studies. 
 
Third, following the convention adopted by studies of this nature, we eliminate financial, 
utility, real estate, trading and Government firms (defined as firm with a total government 
holding of 50 percent and more) from our sample. Fourth, as our study relates to Indian 
corporations, we drop firms, which have a total foreign shareholding component of fifty percent 
and above. Some of these firms could ostensibly be subsidiaries of foreign firms. It also 
precludes any ambiguity involved in classifying firms with a foreign holding of more than 50 
percent as domestic firms. Finally, we drop a few more firms on account of a lack of information 
on some of the variables required for analysis and due to suspicion of typographic errors being 
present in some of the observations. This exercise leads to final sample size of 1005 firms 
belonging to the financial year 1999-2000.
7  Many different industries are represented in the 
sample. With regard to the problem pertaining to outliers, which is common to an empirical 
                                                 
7 The financial year in India commences on the 1st of April and extends to the 31
st of March of the following year. 
Company profit and loss statements pertain to this period while balance sheet figures are as on the 31
st of March 
2000. The Database obtains shareholding information from annual regulatory filings with the Bombay Stock 
Exchange and from company annual reports. As there is a delay in compiling and filing this information with the 
Stock Exchange and also because of the fact that annual reports are published after the end of the financial year, the 
shareholding information pertaining to the period April 1999 to March 2000 is reported in the database during May 





analysis using financial statement data, instead of dropping them from the sample, we cap the 
performance variables at their 1
st and 99
th percentile values. 
 
5. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
5.1 Performance measures 
We use two widely used performance measures to determine firm performance. These 
measures are the Return on Assets (ROA) and a proxy for Tobin’s Q (henceforth referred to as 
the Q ratio). In line with similar studies of this nature, ROA is defined as the operating earnings 
before interest, depreciation and taxes
 over the book value of total assets. The Q ratio is defined 
as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of 
assets. A description of these and other variables used in this study is presented in Table 1. As a 
robustness check we also use the market to book value ratio (M/B), which is defined as the 
market value of equity over the book value of equity. However, as the M/B ratio is substantially 
correlated with the Q ratio and the empirical results do not change qualitatively, we do not report 
these results separately. 
The descriptive statistics on the performance measures of sample firms are presented in 
Panel A of Table 2. The mean (median) return on assets of sample firms is 12.69 percent (13.29 
percent). The maximum and the minimum ROA reveal that our sample contains firms with a 
wide variation in performance with a maximum of 51 percent and a minimum of –35 percent. 
The mean Q ratio in our sample is 1.3. It also indicates a considerable variation with a minimum 





5.2 Explanatory variables  
The most important explanatory variables used in the study are ownership variables. At 
first, we make a broad distinction between foreign shareholders and domestic shareholders. 
Although the identification of foreign shareholders appears to be straightforward, we make a 
slight adjustment to preclude any ambiguity in the definition of ‘foreign’. We do not consider 
equity ownership by Indian individuals staying abroad as foreign shareholders. We also preclude 
ownership by overseas corporate bodies, which are owned directly, or indirectly to the extent of 
at least 60 percent by persons of Indian nationality. These adjustments allow us to specifically 
focus on foreign shareholdings in its true sense. The variables representing foreign and domestic 
shareholdings are denoted as FOR and DOM. 
 Since the purpose of this study is to examine the influence of ownership at a disaggregate 
level, we split the broad ownership variables into important categories. We calculate the 
percentage of common shares held by foreign institutional investors and identify the variable as 
FORI. In recent years, foreign institutional investors have been playing an increasingly 
prominent and highly visible role in India’s capital markets.
8 Although, on average, they account 
only for a small percentage of the shares of Indian listed corporations (see Panel B of Table 2)
9, 
they account for a substantial proportion of the daily stock turnover on the stock exchange, and 
are seen as significant drivers of market sentiment.
10 These funds relate to investments made 
                                                 
8 As of 31
st March 2000 there were 369 foreign institutional investors registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India. As per SEBI figures, for the period 1993 to 1999 net cumulative foreign institutional investors 
investment stood at US$ 9.2 Billion. 
 
9 In our sample, 327 firms have shareholding by foreign financial institutions. The mean (median) value of this sub- 
sample is 3.59 (0.64) percent. 
 
10 While as of January 2000, foreign institutional investors (FIIs) constituted barely 5 percent of the market 
capitalization (which stood at roughly US$ 239 billion), they account for 50 percent of the ‘free float’ (shares that 





primarily by pension funds, mutual funds and insurance funds managed by these foreign 
institutional owners.  
The variable FORC refers to the percentage of common shares held by foreign 
corporations. We observe that a single firm almost always holds the shares belonging to this 
category. These shareholdings are primarily foreign collaborator holdings. As a consequence, 
these holdings do not represent mere financial investments in companies, but substantial 
technical and managerial collaborations with Indian firms. The average (median) FORC in the 
sample is larger than that of the FORI (see Panel B of Table 2). Although, only a limited number 
of Indian firms (138) have foreign corporations as shareholders, the average stake held by these 
foreign corporations in this sub-sample is substantial (17.83 percent). 
Similar to foreign ownership variables, we construct the variable DOMI which refers to 
the percentage of common shares owned by domestic (i.e. Indian) financial institutions. This 
category includes ownership stakes by development financial institutions, insurance companies, 
commercial banks and mutual funds. Development financial institutions comprise of the 
Industrial Development Bank of India, Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, the 
Industrial Finance Corporation of India and the Infrastructure Development Finance Company 
Limited. These four institutions are primarily government owned. Insurance companies are the 
Life Insurance Corporation and the General Insurance Corporation both of which were formed 
after nationalizing many private insurance companies. Under the category of commercial banks 
fall many nationalized banks which account for the bulk of the banking business in the country. 
Private sector banks are also included in this category. Mutual funds include the Unit Trust of 
India and private Indian mutual funds. All together, domestic financial institutions form a fairly 
                                                                                                                                                              
 





significant chunk of the total shareholding of Indian listed corporations. Mean (median) as shown 
in Panel B of Table 2 are 7.13 (2.56) percent. The common feature among all of these disparate 
financial institutions is that with the exception of private banks and mutual funds
11 they are 
predominantly Government owned, and that apart from equity holdings they are also a prominent 
source of debt finance to Indian firms. 
The variable DOMC refers to the percentage of common shares held by domestic Indian 
corporations. This is the largest component of equity ownership in Indian listed firms. The mean 
(median) values of DOMC in the sample are 28.47 (25.74) percent, respectively. We also 
construct another ownership variable DIR, which represents the percentage of common shares, 
owned by all directors (including relatives). These share holdings are held either through their 
individual capacity or through investment channels other than domestic corporations. This 
categorization is practically similar to the definition of a ‘promoter’ under the SEBI (Substantial 
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997. The only difference is that ‘corporate 
promoters’ are classified in this study under domestic corporations (DOMC). The mean (median) 
ownership of directors and their relatives in our sample of firms is 17.28 (10.87) percent. It is the 
second largest category of owners in Indian listed firms. With the exception of foreign 
holdings
12, the descriptive statistics obtained for other shareholders compare favorably with the 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) study (which uses variables which are generally defined in a manner 
                                                 
12 Chibber and Majumdar (1999) do not provide information pertaining to foreign holdings. Khanna and Palepu 
(2000b) use a sample of firms from 1993, and report a mean foreign holding of 8.75 percent. Sarkar and Sarkar 
(2000) use a 1995-96 sample of private manufacturing companies and report a mean holding of 10.1 percent. We 
find a lower figure because the sample we use does not contain foreign holdings of 50 percent and more, and also 
excludes certain other categories of shareholdings, namely those of Non–Resident Indian (NRI) and Overseas 





similar to this study
13) especially considering the differences in sample construction and the time 
period. 
5.3 Control Variables 
The two principal control variables we use are total sales and age. The variable, total sale 
is a proxy for the size of a firm. Size of a firm can have a significant influence over the 
performance of a firm. Large firms are able to exploit substantial economies of scale and scope. 
Alternatively, smaller firms tend to more nimble and adaptive to changes in the competitive 
environment. Summary statistics of total sales presented in Panel C of Table 2 indicate that the 
sample we study consists of firms with a wide variety of sizes. Age is also considered to be an 
important determinant of firm performance. Older firms are more experienced, receive the 
benefits of learning and are associated with first mover advantages. However, older firms are also 
arguably prone to inertia and less flexibility in their ability to adapt to competitive pressures. 
From Panel C of Table 2, one can ascertain that the mean (median) firm in our sample is 23 (16) 
years old. The sample consists of a firm with a wide dispersion of ages with the youngest firm 
being 2 years old while the oldest registering an age of 121 years. 
Apart from these two principal control variables, we adjust for the group affiliation of 
firms and industry factors because differences on these dimensions can also influence the relative 
performance of firms. The identification of business groups in India is relatively easy and non-
controversial because firms are usually members of only one group. As mentioned earlier, group 
firms are substantially managed and owned by the same business family. We use in our study the 
classification as made by the database. It determines group affiliation from a variety of sources, 
                                                 
13 Analyzing a sample of 1567 manufacturing companies for 1995-96, Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) report the following 
mean ownership figures: Financial institutions and institutional investors (9.8 percent), corporations (23.8 percent), 




which include public announcements made by individual corporations and groups, regulatory 
filings and keeping track of new ventures and listings by corporations/groups among others.
14 To 
determine the impact of group affiliation on firm performance we make a distinction between 
non–group firms and group firms. In our sample we have 600 non-group firms and 405 group 
firms.
15 We take into account the effect of group affiliation by constructing a dummy variable, 
which has a value of one in case a firm belongs to a group and zero otherwise. 
Although the database has its own classification of industries, in order to make the 
classification more amenable to that of previous studies, we have recoded these industries into 
their closest two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) equivalents. We define industries 
at the two-digit SIC code level provided that there are at least five firms in one industry group.
16 
In total, the sample firms are distributed over 22 different two digit SIC code industries, which 




We study the effect of foreign and domestic equity ownership on the performance of 
firms. The general form of the regression specification we estimate is: 
 
Performance = f (ownership variables, control variables)        (1) 
                                                 
14 An independent check on group affiliation conducted by us of 100 large Indian corporations has revealed that 
these affiliations are accurate. Furthermore, to assess the time stability of these groupings we looked at the 1995 
ranking of the Financial Express (FE) 500 (a local business publication) listing of largest 500 Indian firms and were 
able to find consistent group affiliations for the firms listed in the FE500 and those present in our sample.  
 
15 The proportion of group firms in our sample is 40 percent, which is exactly same as the proportion of group 
firms/observations in the Indian context reported by Lins and Serveas (2002) and Bertrand et al. (2002) 
 
16 Most firms in India, regardless of being group firms or non-group firms correspond substantially to a single two 






The specification uses corporate performance as measured by ROA and Q as the 
dependent variable. Different categories of ownership variables are used as explanatory 
variables.  This basic specification is estimated using a variety of regression specifications. 
 
The first set of regression equations that we estimate includes broad foreign and domestic 
equity ownership categories and is specified as follows: 
 
Performance i  = β 0 + ß1 FOR i +  ß2 DOM i +  ß3 DIR i  + 
ß4 LOG (Sales) i  +  ß5 LOG (AGE) i  +  
ß6 Group dummy + ∑λ l Industry dummies + ε  i ,   (2) 
 
where i represents the firms in our sample, l represents number of industry dummies  and ε i, is an 
error term. The coefficients ß1 and ß2 measure the average impact of foreign and domestic share 
ownership on firm performance. A major problem with the above regression specification is that 
it fails to uncover the potentially conflicting influence of different categories of foreign and 
domestic ownerships. Therefore, the second set of regression is estimated as follows: 
 
Performance i  = β 0 + ß1 FORI i + ß2 FORC i +  ß3 DOMI i +  ß4 DOMC i +    
ß5 DIR i  + ß6 LOG (Sales) i  +  ß7 LOG (AGE) i  +  
ß8 Group dummy + ∑λ l Industry dummies + ε  i .   (3) 
 
The variables FORI and FORC measure the impact of foreign institutional and foreign 
corporate ownerships separately. Similarly, the variables DOMI and DOMC measure the impact 





We also perform additional regression analysis as robustness checks. In one set of 
regressions, we allow the group dummy to interact with several foreign and domestic ownership 
variables. We include interaction variables to gauge whether the relationship between ownership 
and performance is affected by the fact that a firm belongs to a particular business group. We 
also test for entrenchment effects of the ownership variables using quadratic specifications 
similar to McConnell and Servaes (1990) to examine the influence of inside and outside block 
holders on firm performance. We re-estimate specification (3) using a censored regression 
specification wherein the left and right censoring values are the relevant caps on the dependent 
variable at the 1 percent and 99 percent level. To further check if the hypothesized differences in 
performance with regard to foreign corporate and foreign institutional investors persist with the 
probability of the presence of these shareholders, we use the following logit regression 
specification: 
 
    Probability (Ownership) i  = β 0 + ß1 Performance i + ß2  Foreign ownershipi +  ß3 DOMI i +   
 ß4 DOMC I  +  ß5 DIR i  + ß6 LOG (Sales) i  +  ß7 LOG (AGE) i 
  +  ß8 Group dummy + ε  i .                                              (4) 
 
The variable ownership corresponds to one if a firm has foreign corporate ownership and 
zero otherwise. Similarly, for a specification involving foreign institutional ownership, the 
presence of foreign institutional ownership is coded as one and zero otherwise. Performance is 
measured in separate equations as ROA or Q ratio. The variable foreign ownership is either FORI 
or FORC depending on the regression specification used. The control variables are defined as in 





7.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of OLS regressions are presented in Table 4. In all these regression 
specifications, we include industry dummies to take into account any industry-specific factors 
that could affect firm performance. These coefficient estimates are not reported for the sake of 
brevity. We present in Panels A, B and C, the results obtained from using ROA and Q ratio. 
 The results from the most basic regression model are presented in model (1). We observe 
that the coefficient of foreign ownership (FOR) is positive and statistically significant. This result 
is consistent regardless of whether the performance measure is ROA (Panel A) or the Q ratio 
(Panel B). The finding suggests that foreign ownership positively affects firm performance, and 
provides support for Hypothesis 1. Prior studies also report similar findings. 
As mentioned earlier, an important contribution of this study is to disaggregate foreign 
ownership into its two main components. Models (2) and (4) in Panels A and B of Table 4 
provide the results of break up. When foreign ownership is broken up into those relating to 
foreign corporations (FORC) and those pertaining to foreign institutions (FORI), an interesting 
picture emerges. In Model (2) of Panel A, when the separate effect of FORC and FORI on return 
on assets is considered, we observe that the variable representing ownership  by foreign 
corporations (FORC) remains positive and significant, but ownership by foreign financial 
institutions (FORI) loses its statistical significance completely. The same result is obtained in 
Model (4), where we use additional controls for domestic ownership by disaggregating it into 
domestic institutional and domestic corporate ownership. The result is consistent with our 




When Q ratio is used as the performance variable (models (2) and (4) in Panel B of Table 
4), we find that both foreign corporations (FORC) and foreign institutional investors (FORI) 
variable are positive and statistically significant. We also observe that the regression coefficient 
of FORI (0.076) is considerably larger than that of FORC (0.014). It indicates that foreign 
institutional owners have a larger impact than foreign corporate owners when performance is 
measured using stock market valuation criterion. 
What could be the possible explanation for this result? Firstly, we have noted earlier that 
foreign institutions have substantially lower level of shareholdings compared to foreign 
corporations. This indicates that they have relatively lower incentives to devote time and energy 
to monitor firms. Moreover, foreign institutional owners are not one homogeneous block as is 
often thought to be the case and treated as such in pervious studies. A typical company in our 
sample, which has a foreign institutional ownership component, would have more than one such 
foreign institutional owner. These owners belong to different countries and employ fund 
managers with different investment horizons and different investment philosophies. They are in 
the business of managing and continuously adjusting a portfolio of financial assets. As a 
consequence, it is unlikely that they would be in a position to monitor and significantly influence 
the operating performance of the companies in which they hold fragmented stakes. 
On the other hand, the average shareholdings by foreign corporations are substantially 
higher. The incentives and the rewards to monitor are consequently higher. These corporations 
do not have to devote their time and attention to a multitude of firms in which they have 
investments, which would be the case for a fund manager in a foreign financial institution. 
Furthermore, foreign corporate ownership entails almost always an ownership stake by a single 




institutional investor. It extends to improving managerial and technical expertise in the firms in 
which they invest apart from just a financial contribution. Since these foreign corporations tend 
to be in the same industry as the firm in which they invest in, they have excellent monitoring 
capabilities and the possibility to benchmark managerial performance. Most foreign corporations 
are in India for the long haul considering the size and the future potentialities of the Indian 
market and they expect to earn a long-term return on their investment. 
While our prior results indicate that foreign institutional share holdings have no 
significant impact on firm performance as measured by ROA, the results show that there is a 
significant positive relationship when firm performance is measured by Q ratio. This is consistent 
with our hypothesis H1b. As mentioned earlier, although the influence of foreign corporate 
shareholdings is positive, the magnitude of the estimated regression coefficient is interestingly 
lower than that of foreign institutional investors. Since the performance measure Q ratio is based 
on stock market valuation, the above finding is consistent with the view that foreign institutions 
are either ‘tracking’
17 better performing firms or ‘cherry picking’ them (i.e. investing in firms 
that offer superior market returns). One does not have to delve too deep into the matter to realize 
why this would be the case. Firstly, as stated earlier in the paper, a fund manager’s performance 
is bench marked against some index (a composite of selected stocks) and other competitive funds 
in the same class. It is in the fund manager’s interest to out perform this index and the 
competitors. To this end he/she is constantly on the look out for stocks, which will enable his/her 
portfolio to do that. A fund manager is therefore far more likely to use the exit option rather than 
the voice option in relation to an under performing stock. 
                                                 
17 Foreign institutional investors usually ‘track’ firms that have a high probability of improving their market value. 
When a tracked firm implements improvements, its market value rises because the improvements have been realized 
(Yeung, 2000). Here these foreign investors’ contribution has been merely to ‘track’ firms with high probability of 




Secondly, a close watch on the trading volumes pertaining to the Indian markets would 
testify to the preponderance of foreign institutional investor and to a lesser extent domestic 
institutional investor activity. The typical shareholding patterns of Indian corporations lead to 
this result. The stakes held by all directors and family members is dormant, so too is the 
shareholding by domestic corporations and foreign corporations. Trading activity among the 
general public (directly holding stakes in corporations) is thin and hardly cohesive enough to 
have a discernable impact. This leaves only domestic institutional investors (DOMI) which 
posses the potential to impact trading volumes. However, among the DOMIs it is only the 
domestic mutual funds, which are bound by performance benchmarks similar to foreign 
institutional investors. They constitute only a small proportion of domestic institutional investors. 
Foreign institutional investors are therefore uniquely paced in comparison to other shareholders 
to contribute significantly to the overall volatility in the market. 
Thirdly, bulk purchases by foreign investors have a very high visibility in the media. 
Foreign institutional investors are perceived to have superior and more sophisticated analytical 
abilities and a stake by them is seen as a vote of confidence in the company by the most astute 
and discerning investors. The combined effect of the three factors enumerated above leads to a 
significant impact, which they have on firm performance as measured by the Q ratio. This 
process of ‘tracking’ or cherry picking of stocks however does not translate into a positive and 
significant influence when ROA is the performance measure. Foreign corporate holdings in 
comparison are not actively traded. The positive influence, which it has on Indian corporations, is 
on account of their ability to provide an integrated package of capital, management and 
technology that is less efficiently or easily assembled piecemeal (Chhibber and Majumdar, 1999). 




We undertake a number of robustness checks to determine whether the differential results 
reported with regard to foreign corporate shareholdings and foreign institutional shareholdings 
are on account of the model specifications in Panels A and B of Table 4. This includes re-
estimating the regressions by dropping each of the control variables. In every case, except when 
we do not control for sales the differential result persists. The sales variable is a proxy for firm 
size, and as can be ascertained from the correlation matrix presented in Table 3, is highly 
positively correlated with Foreign institutional ownership (0.28). This suggests that foreign 
institutional investment is primarily in large firms. This ‘size bias’ is consistent with the findings 
of Kang and Stulz (1997), who report a similar, albeit stronger correlation in their analysis of 
foreign portfolio equity ownership in Japan. Moreover, it reinforces the argument that foreign 
institutional investors invest in large, liquid companies which enable them to exit their positions 
quickly at relatively lower cost. 
The above results remain consistent with censored regressions models presented in Panel 
D of Table 4 and to logit regression models presented in Table 5. The censored regression model 
is robust to the distribution of the dependent variable being discrete and continuous which would 
be case when the performance measure is capped. The results of the logit model demonstrate that 
while an increase in ROA or Q ratio is positively associated with the probability of the presence 
of foreign corporate shareholdings (Models (1) and (2) of Table 5), the same does not hold true of 
foreign institutional shareholdings. Models (3) and (4) of Table 5, indicate that while a rise in the 
Q ratio is strongly positively associated with the probability of the presence of foreign 
institutional ownership, a rise in ROA has no significant impact on it. The logit regression also 
confirms the notion that foreign institutional investors primarily invest in firms that are large. 




positively associated with the probability of the presence of foreign institutional investment and 
the magnitude of the coefficient is relatively large. 
The regressions in Models (3) and (4) in Panel A of Table 4 confirm the second 
hypothesis that domestic financial institutional ownership (DOMI) negatively affects firm 
performance. The reported coefficients are large (0.15 for both models) and attest to the severity 
of the negative influence attributed to these block holders. The reasons for these domestic 
financial institutions being poor monitors were broached earlier in the paper and stems primarily 
from the following reasons. Firstly, there is a lack of proper incentives for effective monitoring. 
Secondly, the fact that the monitoring function is not the primary objective of these primarily 
government-owned institutions. Thirdly, that competition between these financial intermediaries 
is non-existent, and finally, that there is hardly any self-monitoring (monitoring of the monitor). 
Models (3) and (4) of Panel B that use Q ratio as the performance measure do not corroborate 
this argument entirely. The variable DOMI is found to exert an insignificant impact on firm 
performance. This result is in partial agreement with Khanna and Palepu (2000a) as they do not 
obtain significant results in any of their cross-sectional model specifications using Tobin’s Q as 
well.
18 However, using panel data from 1990-94, and a specification in which the dependent 
variable is defined as the change in Tobin’s Q from 1990–94, they find a significant negative 
influence. Furthermore, Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) using a similar measure of performance as our 
study too find that domestic institutional investors  have an insignificant effect on company 
value.
19 
                                                 
18 In Khanna and Palepu (2000b), which is a study primarily investigating the influence of diversified groups on firm 
performance and ownership variables are used as controls, the authors report that they do find a negative influence 
by domestic institutional ownership on performance using both ROA and a proxy for Tobin’s Q as performance 
measures. 
 




The results of investigation of the hypothesis that domestic corporate ownership (DOMC) 
positively affects firm performance are presented in Table 4. The regression results of Models (3) 
and (4) in Panels A and B confirm this hypothesis regardless of the performance measure used. 
Although, the coefficient values are considerably smaller in comparison to those reported by 
foreign corporate holdings, in view of the prevalence of this blockholder in most Indian 
corporations and the large stakes held by them, this finding has some important implications. 
Firstly, it is consistent with the notion that large blockholders have an impact on performance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Secondly, it demonstrates that there is a large external domestic 
blockholder, which has a positive and significant influence on firm performance. It, therefore, 
substantiates the reasons elaborated earlier about domestic corporations possessing the ability 
and the incentive to be good monitors as far as the governance of corporations is concerned. 
Thirdly, this is a finding, which is consistent with positive influence exerted by corporate 
holdings as reported by Claessens (1997) and Qi et al. (2000), and therefore, has a cross-country 
relevance. It is broadly in agreement with Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) who find that corporate 
shareholdings beyond 25 percent positively and significantly influence company value.  
Our fourth hypothesis states that ownership by owner managers positively affects firm 
performance. All models in Panel A of Table 4 confirm this result. The coefficient estimates of 
the variable DIR are relatively large and statistically significant. However, the variable loses 
significance in the models in Panel B of Table 4 where Q ratio is used as a performance measure. 
The lack of statistical significance of owner manager ownership with regard to Q ratio seems to 
suggest that the capital market in India perceives executive director and family holdings to be of 
minor importance. A plausible explanation could be that the proportion of executive and family 
director holdings is larger in smaller companies (see Table 3), which tend to be undervalued in 




The last main hypothesis of our study is that affiliation of firms belonging to Indian 
business groups is negatively associated with firm performance. The empirical result is presented 
in  Panels A and B of Table 4. We find that  the variable Group Dummy is negative and 
statistically significant. This negative influence holds true for all models regardless of the 
performance measure chosen.
20 The results suggest the sub-optimal allocative functioning of the 
internal capital markets in these group firms in an emerging economy context such as India. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000b) also find a statistically significant negative influence of least and 
intermediate diversified groups on firm performance as measured by return on assets. 
The results of the investigation of the impact of domestic corporate ownership in group 
firms on firm performance are presented in Panel C of Table 4. The interaction variable 
DOMCINT is used to examine the hypothesis. The coefficient of the variable is negative in both 
ROA and Q ratio regressions, and is statistically significant in the latter case. The findings 
indicate that the earlier documented positive influence attributed to domestic corporate 
ownership for all firms is reduced in case of a group-affiliation. It provides evidence of an 
interesting dichotomy associated with domestic corporate ownership. It indicates that domestic 
corporate ownership in group firms is used as a vehicle by traditional family based groups to 
exert their influence on the affairs of the firm and extort private benefits of control. Bebchuk et 
al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (2000) present arguments on how these domestic corporate holdings 
can be used to form pyramids that can be effectively employed for the purpose of tunneling 
resources at the expense of other shareholders.  
We find that the mean (median) share ownership by domestic corporations (DOMC) 
belonging to group firms is 34.22 (35.08) whereas the respective figures for non-group firms are 
                                                 
20 Moreover, an ANOVA analysis whose results are not presented for reasons of brevity also revealed significant 




20.23 (14.92). In contrast, the mean (median) figures all directors and relatives (DIR) are 7.78 
(1.54) for group firms and 23.69 (20.76) for non-group firms. These large differences between 
the DOMC and DIR variables between group and non-group firms clearly suggest that the major 
proportion of group influence is channeled through domestic corporate holdings. 
The variable DIRINT representing owner managers belonging to group firms is found to 
negatively influence firm performance. In line with our previous result (Panels A and B of Table 
4), a statistically significant finding is obtained when return on assets is used as the performance 
measure. The coefficient of DIRINT is significantly negative. The result is in sharp contrast to 
the strong positive effect of the DIR variable for the whole sample as shown in Panel A of Table 
4, and reinforces the negative influence that group affiliation brings to bear.  
The combination of the DIRINT and the DOMCINT variables represent the total quantum 
of ‘insider’ holding in group firms. The total ‘insider’ effect in group firms manifests itself 
through both these interaction variables. Our results broadly suggest that insider ownership 
lowers firm performance when firms are affiliated with a group. 
Panel C also depicts results of the interaction of the Group Dummy with other ownership 
variables. Of particular interest is the result of the interaction of the foreign institutional 
ownership variable with the Group Dummy (FORIINT). The Q ratio regression result indicates 
that FORIINT negatively influences firm performance. The finding is consistent with our earlier 
hypothesis pertaining to foreign institutional investors wherein we postulate that their impact on 
performance is restricted to the stock marked based performance measure only. This result, 
which is also similar to DOMCINT, suggests that stock market based performance gain 
associated with foreign institutional investors is eroded partially if the ownership stake is in 




The logit regression results presented in Models (3) and (4) of Table 5 suggest that there 
is higher probability of the presence of foreign institutional investors for group firms. However, 
the regression results in Panel C of Table 4 show that investment by them in group firms does not 
improve performance. This finding casts some doubt on the ability of foreign institutional 
investors to improve transparency in group firms. 
Similar to the robustness check undertaken for foreign blockholders, all domestic 
blockholders are also subjected to censored regressions. The censored regression specification 
results in Panel D of Table 4 are consistent with our regression estimates on the influence of 
these ownership variables on firm performance. It confirms the robustness of our results. The 
coefficient of domestic corporate ownership is positive and statistically significant. Ownership by 
domestic institutional investors is inversely related with return on assets. The holdings by 
directors and relatives are positively related with return on assets indicating that owner managers 
significantly influence firm performance. The robustness check also confirms the negative 
influence on performance of firms affiliated with groups. In addition to the censored regression 
specification, we use models incorporating quadratic specifications for all ownership variables. 
Since none of these variables is found to be significant at conventional levels, we do not report 
the results. 
8. CONCLUSION 
  Our study demonstrates the necessity of disaggregating foreign ownership into foreign 
institutional and foreign corporate shareholdings. These two categories of shareholders need to 
viewed and analyzed separately. The underlying dynamics governing the investments by 
institutions and corporations are vastly different. Our findings also highlight the fact that the role 




reported by earlier studies on aggregate foreign shareholdings need additional review. The 
distinction we are making in this study between foreign portfolio/institutional ownership and 
foreign direct/corporate ownership holds relevance among the broader comity of emerging 
economies, which are characterized by increasing external capital inflows. Further studies 
facilitating this distinction in other emerging economies and using a cross-country approach is 
therefore warranted. This by no means discounts the positive role, which financial institutions 
have played in advanced economies particularly in the United States in reforming corporate 
boardrooms, fostering greater accountability and thereby ensuring that shareholders get adequate 
returns from their investment. However, with the stakes which foreign institutions currently 
posses and the limited number of firms that they are currently active in suggest that they have a 
considerable distance to travel before they begin to assume the mantle of being stellar corporate 
reformists/monitors. Foreign corporations, on the other hand, have unambiguously a positive 
influence on firm performance and as we have argued earlier in the paper, they are able to do so 
through diverse means.  
It is however, an undeniable fact that only a small proportion of Indian firms posses 
foreign corporate share holdings even though their stakes in individual firms may be substantial. 
While their numbers and holding levels are expected to rise in the foreseeable future, in the short 
and medium term, domestic shareholders have to don the mantle of corporate reformers. Among 
the outside domestic shareholders, the study shows that domestic corporations positively 
influence firm performance although the coefficients do not have the same magnitudes as for 
foreign corporations. Nevertheless, the result assumes significance in view of the fact that 
blockholdings by these domestic corporations constitute among the largest blocks of 
concentrated stock holding, and unlike domestic financial institutions their monitoring abilities 




further along the learning curve and spill over effects being to manifest themselves to a greater 
degree, the quality of the monitoring effort should enhance. However, there is evidence to 
suggest that these benefits could be eroded if these domestic corporations belong to the same 
group. In fact, a common thread running along all our group level analysis is the negative 
influence associated with group firms regardless of the performance measure chosen.  
In the longer term as the government progressively relinquishes control over domestic 
financial institutions, Indian private institutional investors gain in prominence and knowledge 
spill over effects of foreign institutional investor activity begin to bear fruit, there could possibly 
be a reversal of some of the negative influence reported by earlier studies as well as ours with 
regard to domestic financial institutions. It needs to be noted though, that especially with regard 
to domestic mutual funds, being financial institutions of similar nature they suffer from some of 
the very same problems that plague foreign institutional investors. 
Finally, the story as far as directors and their relatives share holding is concerned is a 
mixed bag. The strong positive influence, which these shareholders exert when return on assets is 
the measure of performance, is encouraging. Here too the caveat is that these results are 
moderated if these directors belong to group companies. Their lack of influence with regard to 
stock market measures of performance is puzzling. Further research taking into account more 
board level parameters and examining their influence on performance may shed more light on 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
Performance variables: 
ROA = Return on Assets defined as the {(Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation)/Book value of total 
assets} 
Q Ratio = (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Total Debt)/Book Value of Total Assets 
 
Ownership variables: 
FOR = Percentage of common shares owned by foreign institutional investors and foreign corporations.  
FORI = Percentage of common shares owned by foreign institutional investors 
FORC = Percentage of common shares owned by foreign corporations 
DOM = Percentage of common share owned by domestic (Indian) financial institutions and domestic corporations  
DOMI = Percentage of common share owned by domestic financial institutions 
DOMC = Percentage of common share owned by domestic corporations 
DIR = Percentage of common shares owned by all directors and relatives 
 
Principal control variables: 
Sales = Annual sales turnover in Millions of Rupees
21 
Age = Number of years since the date of incorporation of the company 
 
 
Interaction variables:  
 
FORIINT = FORI*Group Dummy 
 
FORCINT = FORC*Group Dummy 
 
DOMIINT = DOMI*Group Dummy 
 
DOMCINT = DOMC*Group Dummy 
 
DIRINT = DIR*Group Dummy 
                                                 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
The sample consists of 1005 Indian firms (defined as having a firm having a foreign shareholding of less than 50 
percent) listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Financial, utility, real estate, trading and Government (defined as 
firms in which the Government has a stake of 50 percent and more) firms are excluded. Annual data for the fiscal 
year 1999-2000 are analyzed. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
 





Mean Median  Maximum  Minimum  Standard 
Deviation 
ROA  (%)  12.69 13.29 51.00 -35.00 12.88 
Q 1.30  0.80  10.80  0.23  1.59 
 




Mean Median  Maximum  Minimum  Standard 
Deviation 
FORI 1.17  0.00  44.80  0.00  3.96 
FORC 2.45  0.00  48.99  0.00  7.86 
FOR 3.62  0.00  49.00  0.00  8.88 
DOMI 7.13  2.56  66.19  0.00  9.77 
DOMC 28.47  25.74  100.00  0.00  21.38 
DOM 35.60  33.41  100.00  0.00  24.02 
DIR 17.28  10.87  91.20  0.00  18.97 
 














































Table 3: Pearson correlation matrix 
 
Variable  FORI FORC  FOR DOMI  DOMC  DOM  DIR  Sales Age  ROA Q 
FORI  1             
F O R C   0 . 0 2   1            
FOR 0.46**
  0.90**  1          
DOMI  0.12**  -0.01  0.04  1         
DOMC  0.01  -0.05  -0.04  0.06  1        
DOM  0.06  -0.05  -0.02  0.46**  0.92  1       
DIR  -0.14** -0.16** -0.20** -0.3**  -0.49** -0.56** 1         
Sales  0.28** -0.02  0.11** 0.25** 0.08** 0.17** -0.15**  1       
Age  0.11** 0.02  0.07*  0.38** 0.18** 0.32** -0.18  0.28** 1     
ROA  0.08** 0.10** 0.13** -0.02  0.07*  0.06  0.07*  0.10** 0.10** 1   
Q  0.22**  0.04 0.13**  -0.03  0.02 0.00 -0.00  0.04 -0.09**  0.11**  1 
 
       ** denotes significance at the 1 percent level 




Table 4: The relationship between ownership and performance 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of firm performance on ownership and firm-specific 
control variables. The sample consists of 1005 Indian firms (defined as a firm having a foreign 
shareholding of less than 50 percent) listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Financial, utility, real estate, 
trading and Government (defined as firms in which the Government has a stake of 50 percent and more) 
firms are excluded. Annual data for the fiscal year 1999-2000 are analyzed. The regressions are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. Industry dummies are included in each regression but their coefficients are 
not reported. The asterisks ***, ** and, * denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 






Model  (2)  Model  (3)  Model  (4) 
FORI   -0.018   -0.003 
FORC   0.134**   0.130** 
FOR  0.104**   0.104**  
DOMI   -0.156***  -0.154*** 
DOMC   0.041*  0.040* 
DOM  0.018 0.017    
DIR 0.102***  0.102*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 
Log Sales  3.098***  3.150*** 3.263*** 3.307*** 
Log  Age  -0.957 -0.939 -0.0384  -0.375 
Group Dummy  -2.989***  -2.917*** -3.039*** -2.976*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.202 0.202 0.217 0.217 











Model  (1)  Model  (2)  Model  (3)  Model  (4) 
FORI   0.076***   0.076*** 
FORC   0.014***   0.014*** 
FOR 0.027***    0.0267***   
DOMI   0.004  0.003 
DOMC   0.006*  0.006** 
DOM 0.006*  0.006**     
DIR  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Log  Sales  0.023 0.001 0.024 0.004 
Log  Age  -0.197** -0.204** -0.191** -0.196** 
Group  Dummy -0.204* -0.233**  -0.204* -0.234** 
Adjusted R
2  0.317 0.334 0.316 0.333 











ROA   Q ratio 
FORI 0.032  0.134*** 
FORIINT -0.071  -0.086** 
FORC 0.066  0.009 
FORCINT 0.123  0.009 
DOMI -0.098*  0.002 
DOMIINT -0.109*  0.001 
DOMC 0.047*  0.009** 
DOMCINT -0.029  -0.007** 
DIR 0.115***  0.002 
DIRINT -0.075*  0.006 
Log Sales  3.262***  0.001 
Log Age  -0.374  -0.189** 
Adjusted R
2 0.215  0.345 





Panel D: Censored regressions 
 
This table presents the results of censored regressions of firm performance on ownership and firm specific 
control variables. The sample consists of 1005 Indian firms (defined as having a firm having a foreign 
shareholding of less than 50 percent) listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Financial, utility, real estate, 
trading and Government firms (defined as firms in which the Government has a stake of 50 percent and 
more) excluded. Annual data for the fiscal year 1999-2000 are analyzed. All variables are defined in Table 







ROA Q  ratio 
FORI 0.002 0.077*** 
FORC 0.133***  0.014** 
DOMI -0.155***  0.003 
DOMC 0.041*  0.006*** 
DIR 0.095***  0.002 
Log Sales  3.327***  0.011 
Log Age  -0.394  -0.205*** 
Group Dummy  -2.979***  -0.238** 
Adjusted R
2 0.216  0.316 
Log likelihood  -3833.460  -1685.706 
χ













Table 5: Logit regressions of foreign corporate and foreign institutional holdings 
 
This table presents the results of binary logit regressions of foreign corporate and foreign institutional 
ownerships. Models (1) and (2) use foreign corporate ownership dummy as the dependent variable while 
Models (3) and (4) use foreign institutional ownership dummy as the dependent variable. The sample 
consists of 1005 Indian firms (defined as having a firm having a foreign shareholding of less than 50 
percent) listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Financial, utility, real estate, trading and Government firms 
(defined as firms in which the Government has a stake of 50 percent and more) excluded. Annual data for 
the fiscal year 1999-2000 are analyzed. All variables are defined in Table 1. The asterisks ***, ** and, * 








Model  (2)  Model  (3)  Model  (4) 
ROA 0.017**    0.004   
Q  ratio  0.101**   0.269*** 
FORI  -0.007 -0.017    
FORC    0.021**  0.020** 
DOMI -0.020*  -0.019**  -0.010  0.009 
DOMC -0.019***  -0.023*** -0.011** -0.012*** 
DIR -0.037***  -0.036*** -0.02**  -0.013** 
Log Sales  -0.010  0.040  0.526*** 0.529*** 
Log  Age  0.102 0.145 -0.058  0.054 
Group  Dummy  0.252 0.243 0.438**  0.531*** 
McFadden R
2  0.051 0.049 0.169 0.191 
Log  Likelihood  -381.462 -382.257 -526.635 -512.603 
LR statistic  41.190***  39.599***  214.746***  242.809*** 
 